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W H I T E  W O R K I N G - C L A S S  D I S U N I T Y :  
THE SOUTHERN RHODESIA LABOUR PARTY*
M . C . S T E E L E  
University o f Rhodesia
in the literature currently available on the Southern Rhodesia Labour 
Party (S.R.L.P.) and cognate trades and political organisations operating 
during the Second World War, the theme of white working-class disunity has 
received less scrutiny than the more spectacular theme of conflicting attitudes 
towards race, as epitomised in the controversy surrounding the African Branch 
of the S.R.L.P..1 Whilst that issue was the overt and immediate cause of the 
disintegration of the party before the 1946 general election, it also served 
as a convenient pretext for fission, thereby obscuring a long history of 
rancour and discord due to personality differences, party organisation and 
policy considerations, which was of equal significance. Doris Lessing deftly 
summarised the motives underlying the manipulation of the African Branch 
as a politically emotive issue in her partisan but perceptive interpretation of 
H. H. Davies’s2 behaviour at the abortive reunion conference at Gwelo in 
1945: ‘The issue that was fought out on the surface was the question of the 
colour bar. This was exactly as Mr. Davies had intended, because whenever 
racial questions are discussed reason flies out of the window, and people 
become unbalanced.’3
From its inception at the Labour fusion congress of January 1944 to its 
virtual demise in the election of April 1946, the S.R.L.P. was subject to 
continual assaults from within as well as from without; for by its very 
origin, the S.R.L.P. was heir to a long tradition of bitter rivalries. At the 
beginning of the War, H. H. Davies and Jack Keller,4 two foundation
* This article is based on a lecture delivered to the Central Africa Historical Association 
Conference held in August 1970.
1 The main documentary source is the group of papers deposited by the Southern 
Rhodesia Labour Party and collected together as ‘Correspondence and Other Papers’ 
[SR9 1] in the Historical Manuscripts Collection o f the National Archives o f Rhodesia; 
many o f these papers in fact are o f the original Rhodesia Labour Party to which the 
S.R.L.P. was heir. The principal secondary sources are C. Leys, European Politics in 
Southern Rhodesia, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1959, in which the account is marred by 
certain factual inaccuracies; I. Henderson and P. R. Warhurst, Revisions in Central 
African History, Salisbury, Central Africa Historical Association, 1965, Local Series No. 15, 
in which Labour’s failure in two post-war elections is discussed; The Labour Front, a 
monthly published by the S.R.L.P.; The Labour Era, an infrequent publication of ‘The 
Labour Party’ (later , the revived Rhodesia Labour Party); D . Lessing, A Ripple from the 
Storm, London, M. Joseph, 1958, in which there is an account o f the fortunes o f the S.R.L.P.
2 Harry Herbert Davies (1878-1957); b. Wales; arrived in Southern Rhodesia in 1920 
and became an estate agent in Bulawayo; represented various Bulawayo constituencies, 
1928-48; Minister o f Internal Affairs 1939-43.
3 SR9 1/4/3 [Policy: Jan. 1938-D ec. 1947, General: Feb. 1944-D ec. 1947], Doris 
Lessing to The Rhodesia Herald, 15.xii.1945 (not sent).
4 Laurence Walter Keller (1885-1959); b. London; Organising Secretary, Rhodesia 
Railway Workers Union 1920-45; represented (Bulawayo) Raylton, 1928-58; Minister 
without Portfolio 1940-43.
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members of the original Rhodesia Labour Party (R.L.P.) who both represent­
ed Bulawayo constituencies in the Legislative Assembly had accepted 
Huggins’s offer to join the Government; but they had done this without 
reference to their National Executive Committee and their action was 
approved only after considerable misgiving. Then, following the precedent 
set by Winston Churchill a month earlier, Huggins in June 1940 invited 
Labour as a whole to participate in a National Government, but amended 
the details of his offer during the negotiations and insisted upon a common 
parliamentary caucus. When a special R.L.P. Congress rejected the proposals, 
Davies, Keller and a third Member, Thomas Kimble, resigned from the 
R.L.P. and set up a new party under the somewhat exclusive title, ‘The Labour 
Party’, which accepted the Prime Minister’s terms.® Keller justified his 
action: ‘I have only done what has been done by greater leaders than myself 
who are situated in the Old Country.’6 Not unreasonably, the R.L.P. pointed 
out that its pledge to help the war effort and to offer constructive criticism 
conceded the substance of Huggins’s call for national unity; whereas in view 
of the Government’s large majority, a National Government might prove as 
fatal to the R.L.P. as the British precedent had to Ramsay Macdonald’s 
followers, or might lead to ‘constant irritation and disagreement’ in the 
councils of state.7 Rational arguments, however, were overshadowed by the 
personal animosity that permanently soured relations between the two 
Labour factions. Acceptance of office by Davies as Minister of Internal 
Affairs and Keller as Minister Without Portfolio evoked charges against them 
of political opportunism and the betrayal of socialist principles; Keller, in 
particular, was often goaded into making intemperate outbursts in the House 
matched in their virulence only by the occasional display of childishness 
emanating from one or two of the more outspoken R.L.P. Members.
This factionalism also mirrored the traditional rivalry between Bulawayo 
and Salisbury. Bulawayo, the trade-union centre, and the Midlands were 
the stronghold of Davies, whilst the more cosmopolitan administrative centre 
of Salisbury and its ally, Umtali, remained loyal to the R.L.P. Thus ‘The 
Labour Party’ based on Bulawayo and the trade-unions maintained the 
exclusive white socialist policy of the pre-war R.L.P., as summarised in its 
Statement o f Policy: ‘In the white areas . . .  the native will be confined largely 
to the performance of the unskilled work.’8 Its essentially pragmatic outlook 
was directed more towards immediate problems confronting the white 
artisan, such as social security and the preservation of ‘civilised’ standards
5 For a detailed account of this complicated episode, see SR9 1/1/1 [Branch: Aug. 1938 
-N ov . 1947, General: Aug. 1938-Sept. 1942], Mrs. G. Maasdorp to J. D. Collins, 
24.vi.1940; her comment that, ‘Mr. Davies committed the Party to more than he should’ 
in his negotiations with Huggins suggests that the Labour split was due to a basic mis­
understanding. The interpretation of ‘The Labour Party’ differs in certain particulars, 
and is outlined in The Labour Era, 27.x. 1945; see also Southern Rhodesia Legislative 
Assembly Debates, 20, C.2144, 19.ii.1941.
6 Debates, 20 ,c,1322, 13.viii.1940.
7 Ibid., 23, c.1117, J. B. Lister (R.L.P. Member for Umtali South), 26.V.1943.
8 Statement o f  P olicy . . . ,  Salisbury, for Rhodesia Labour Party, [1938] p.7; a copy 
is in SR9 1/4/1, Policy: Jan. 1938 - Dec. 1947, General: June 1938 - Nov. 1943.
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in the face of mounting African economic competition, than towards the 
more theoretical implications of socialist philosophy.
In contrast, the R.L.P. now dominated by the ‘Salisbury wing’, as Leys 
calls it,9 had embarked upon a critical re-examination of its former assump­
tions, impelled by anti-fascist propaganda.10 Although orientated towards 
contemporary events in Europe at first, discussions inevitably turned to the 
application of socialist principles to the Southern Rhodesian racial situation; 
and a spate of resignations occasioned by personality clashes removed most 
of the conservative elements from the ‘Salisbury wing’ during 1942. Thus by 
the end of the War, the ‘radicals’ had formulated a policy approximate to 
that of an orthodox Western social democratic party, which attempted to 
reconcile ideology with the intractable reality of a rigidly-stratified society.
On 20 February 1942 the Huggins Ministry easily survived a Motion of 
No Confidence with the assistance of Davies’s Labour Party group, but at 
the cost of the secession of four Government Members, two of whom, 
E. P. Vemall and F. D. Thompson, at length joined the R.L.P.11 Thus by 
April 1943 the two Labour parties had ten Members in a House of thirty; 
and together with ‘cross-bench’ Members, they constituted a potentially 
serious, though as yet fragmented challenge to the disintegrating United 
Party. The initiative for Labour reunification nevertheless emerged from an 
extra-parliamentary source.
Branches of the R.L.P. began appealing to the Executive to take action, 
and then the Trades and Labour Council, spokesman for the majority of the 
Colony’s trade unions, invited the R.L.P. Executive to participate in the 
National Rhodesia Labour Collaboration Committee, an ad hoc body on 
which the Trades and Labour Council was to have a majority of seats.12 
The R.L.P. decided to participate in these unity discussions in the growing 
hope of office after the War, in view of the trend to the left in Western 
politics. Then in the midst of these talks, Davies and Keller were expelled 
from the Cabinet on 12 October 1943 after attending a separate caucus of 
their party in defiance of the terms under which the National Government 
had been established. Whereupon the Labour Party’s four Members crossed 
the floor to the Opposition Benches, and the path was now clear for Labour 
unity.
Agreement in principle was reached before the end of 1943, and the 
inaugural Congress of the new Southern Rhodesia Labour Party held on 9
9 Leys, p.185.
10 From as early as 1938 a Current Affairs Group, a characteristically middle-class in­
formal association of R.L.P. intellectuals and certain outsiders, had studied Left Book 
Club publications; information from Mr. R. Isaacson, interview 21.ix.1970.
11 Debates, 21, c.3555, 20.ii.1942. Leys, p. 186, incorrectly gives 1943 instead of 1942, 
as the date for Vemall’s joining the R.L.P., and makes no mention of Thompson. Their 
‘crossing the floor’ was due more to personal differences with Huggins than to ideological 
or socialist beliefs.
12 Mrs. Maasdorp, the party’s General Secretary, commented in a letter to the British 
Labour Party: ‘Now we are hoping, on the insistence of the Trade Union movement, to 
achieve union at an early date, and to associate the industrial with the political section’, 
SR9 1/5/2 [Miscellaneous, General: Dec. 1943 - March 1947], 28.X.1943.
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January 1944. The party was entirely ‘political’ in organisation, as the 
Trades and Labour Council had sought no direct representation on its 
Executive — a decision it regretted later. The draft S.R.L.P. constitution 
was ratified at a later Congress. Membership was to be open to all those 
over the age of eighteen, irrespective of race, and the principal policy sub­
clause quoted that of the 1918 British Labour Party constitution, with sligh 
emendation:
To secure for all people by constitutional means the full fruits of their 
industry and the most equitable distribution thereof that may be possible 
upon the basis of common ownership of the means of production, distribu­
tion and exchange, and the best obtainable system of public administration 
and control of each industry and service.13
The specific goals established for a post-war socialist government were 
defined in another document, the Short Term Policy, a moderate programme 
modifying and limiting the doctrinaire aims of this sub-clause of the con­
stitution, and drawing inspiration from the not dissimilar British Labour 
Party blueprint. It prescribed such objectives as a State Bank, the nationalisa­
tion of transport, free and compulsory education for all races, a national 
housing scheme and a comprehensive system of social security. James Lister, 
S.R.L.P. Member for Umtali South, captured its Utilitarian spirit in his 
assertion that ‘the number of happy homes contained within its borders’ 
was the only true criterion of a nation’s greatness.14 Only one sub-section 
of a programme for Africans, which affirmed African workers’ right to 
organise, can be deemed radical. Others have a familiar ring: ‘Fresh avenues 
of employment will be opened up for Africans in the service of their own 
people’; education was to have ‘emphasis on teaching and training that will 
best fit him to become a responsible and self-respecting citizen’. Nevertheless, 
the general emphasis placed upon the need to stimulate black economic and 
political advance in white areas was a new departure from traditional Labour 
policy.15
A real problem facing the new party, was the severe difficulty of organisa­
tion at the ‘grass roots’ level, because of vast distances and far-flung member­
ship. District branches tended to become moribund between elections, and 
exigencies of war such as petrol-rationing aggravated this propensity. Labour 
suffered from a further disadvantage in that ‘working-class’ branch officials 
and delegates lacked the comparative freedom of their employers and other 
self-employed persons such as farmers to absent themselves from work and 
attend national meetings.
The R.L.P.’s solution to these problems before the War had been the 
creation by its Honorary Organiser, Col. Walker, of a highly-centralised
13 SR9 1/2/2 [Congress: June 1928 - March 1947, General: May 1944 - March 1947], 
‘Minutes o f the Annual Congress . . .  held . . .  23-24.ix.1944’. The relationship o f these 
two-clauses was the subject of an editorial in New Rhodesia, 23.xi.1945.
14 Southern Rhodesia Labour Party. Short Term Policy, Salisbury, for A. A. Draper 
1946; Debates, 25, c.2016, 27.vi.1945.
15 Short Term Policy, section 9, ‘Native Policy’; this was drafted by Macintyre.
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though broadly-based machine to govern the affairs of the party between 
annual congresses and to co-ordinate its activities. This body, the National 
Executive Committee, was now incorporated into the 1944 constitution of 
the S.R.L.P. and renamed the National Executive Council (N.E.C.). Its 
central role in the organisation and history of the S.R.L.P. has been over­
looked by previous commentators, who have focused their attention on 
personalities and policies to the exclusion of institutions. The N.E.C., 
situated in Salisbury, comprised ten officials (its R.L.P. predecessor had had 
fifteen), all the Members of Parliament, and one representative for each 
Branch. As meetings were held usually at monthly intervals, it was not 
feasible for the representatives from outlying branches to attend, and so 
such branches were able to be represented by proxy.16 These proxies were 
nominated by the N.E.C. on behalf of the branches concerned, subject to 
their subsequent approval, from members living in and around the capital. 
Likewise, as a matter of administrative convenience, Congress drew on this 
pool of Salisbury members to select most of the ten N.E.C. officials.
Thus, although Congress was in theory the sole determiner of policy, the 
N.E.C. had ample initiative in this sphere; it not only directed day-to-day 
administration but also established the principal guide-lines for the formula­
tion of policy. Congress accordingly became an approbatory, rather than 
an innovating body; and in effect the affairs of the S.R.L.P., as of its pre­
decessor, the R.L.P., were conducted by a powerful standing committee, 
over which the liberal ‘Salisbury wing’ exerted an influence out of all 
proportion to its numbers.17 18
Nevertheless, the N.E.C.’s centralised machinery and the proxy system 
enabled party officials to maintain close liaison with branches, permitting a 
hitherto unparalleled degree of democracy in day-to-day decision-making, 
without the sacrifice of administrative efficiency. Draper’s10 justifiable 
assertion that the S.R.L.P. was the first Rhodesian political party to sustain 
a permanent structure of functioning branches is corroborated by the large
16 SR9 1/2/2, S.R.L.P. Constitution, section 6.
17 An illustration of the undemocratic consequences of this distribution of power is the 
special R.L.P. congress of August 1940 that had rejected Davies’s resolution to accept 
Huggins’s coalition offer. A majority of branches (directly represented at annual congress) 
voted in favour of the resolution, but the ballots o f N.E.C. officials, most o f the Members 
of the Legislative Assembly and three proxies voting in defiance o f their branches’ wishes 
reversed this to a final tally of 24 to 15, SR9 1/2/1, Congress: June 1928 - March 1947, 
General: June 1928 -Aug. 1940, Minutes of Special Congress 18.viii.1940. Reasons of 
distance necessitated a dual representation of branches at Congress, directly by elected 
delegates and indirectly by their N.E.C. alternates, both of which groups had full voting 
powers. This right of the N.E.C. to vote at Congress became a grievance of the Davies 
faction, The Labour Era, 27.X.1945. Thus after the final Labour split o f January 1946, the 
revived Rhodesia Labour Party restricted such prerogatives to ‘duly appointed delegates’ 
specifically excluding members of the Executive and of the Legislative Assembly from 
voting at Congress ‘unless selected by a branch as a delegate’, ibid., January 1946.
18 Alexander Aitkin Draper (1892-1967); b. Scotland; arrived in Rhodesia in 1912 
and became a farmer in Bromley and later an estate agent in Salisbury; President of 
S.R.L.P. 1945-48.
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number of branches and paid-up members active during a time of national 
and world crisis.19
Nevertheless, the weaknesses of the new party were not slow to appear: 
indeed, they were explicit in its making. At the inaugural Congress, ‘The 
Labour Party’ delegates were outnumbered four to one, a circumstance 
indubitably responsible for Keller’s impulsive walk-out and his later allega­
tion that it had not been ‘truly representative’.20 This was the harbinger of 
further contention. Accustomed to the more easy-going methods of ‘The 
Labour Party’, the Davies faction was exasperated by the insistence of the 
N.E.C. upon proper office procedure in administration. Its delay in register­
ing Davies’s own branch, Hillside (Bulawayo), on the legitimate ground that 
the twelve required membership forms had not arrived at headquarters, was 
interpreted as a personal affront,21 particularly as the N.E.C. had registered 
the African Headquarters branch without hesitation.
Mrs. Maasdorp, the General Secretary, Col. Walker, the Hon. Organiser, 
and Macintyre, the Parliamentary Leader, were the principal targets of this 
animosity. As an assistant to Walker, Mrs. Maasdorp22 had been instrument­
al in transforming the pre-war R.L.P. from an amateurish political group 
into an efficient and professional party. Her zeal, dedication and burning 
sincerity, her long record of community service for all races, and her essential 
humanitarianism flavoured with a dash of moderate socialism had exerted 
a notable formative influence over the political philosophy of the ‘Salisbury 
wing’. Before reunion, Walker and Maasdorp had been assailed by certain 
elements in the R.L.P. who sought their resignation, and at no stage could 
their relations with ‘The Labour Party’ group be regarded as cordial. But 
the venom of this group was especially reserved for Macintyre,23 a trade- 
unionist turned businessman, whom they despised as a typical working-class 
arriviste. The R.L.P. majority on the joint Labour caucus established im­
mediately after the departure of ‘The Labour Party’ Members from the 
Huggins coalition had ensured that Macintyre as leader of R.L.P. Members 
should retain that position in the still provisional S.R.L.P.. This choice was 
to have fateful consequences. Within a week, Davies and his colleagues 
deserted their new allies because of the leadership controversy and voted for
19 SR9 1/2/2, statement made at the Annual Congress, 16.ix.1945. Twenty-five branches 
were registered after the first Congress, and 822 paid-up members were on the booksin 
January 1945. The largest branches were located in Davies’s strongholds like Selukwe, 
Shabani and Raylton. By the 1946 election, the membership had been whittled down to 
approximately 300.
20 SR9 1/5/12 Miscellaneous, Summary of Events: March 1945 - March 1946, Chrono­
logical Statement of Events, ll.i.1944.
21 See correspondence between Mrs. Maasdorp and A. J. Davies, Hillside Branch 
Secretary, SR9 1/1/4 [Branch: Aug. 1938-N ov. 1947, General: Nov. 1943 - June 1947],
22 Gladys G. F. Maasdorp (1886-1960); b. Cape; arrived in Southern Rhodesia in 
1920; a physical training teacher; active in many community service organisations, in­
cluding the Federation of Native Welfare Societies; Mayor of Salisbury 1942-43; Hon. 
Secretary o f the R.L.P. and later of the S.R.L.P., 1938-44.
23 Donald Macintyre, b. 1891 in Glasgow; active trade-unionist in South Africa and 
later became a business-man in Bulawayo; Mayor of Bulawayo several times; represented 
various Bulawayo constituencies 1938-53; Minister o f Finance in Federal Government 
1953-62; knighted 1961.
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the Government in a Motion of Confidence on 20 October 1943. Conceivably 
the crisis might have been avoided had both Davies and Macintyre stood 
aside for an uncommitted third candidate. Several branches had urged this, 
and continued to do so; but the fate of Walker, in a similar position as leader 
of the revived R.L.P. in 1946 indicates that the issues dividing the Labour 
movement transcended personalities.
A Bulawayo North branch meeting held in August 1944 served as a battle­
ground in the most literal sense for the many abrasive personalities in the 
S.R.L.P. At an earlier meeting held to elect delegates for a forthcoming 
congress, the Chairman, a supporter of Davies, unconstitutionally ruled that 
only those members who had joined the party more than three months 
beforehand were entitled to vote, and refused to reverse his ruling later when 
the N.E.C. drew attention to his error. The Branch Secretary, H. H. Davies 
Jnr., neglected to destroy the ballots after the meeting, and on impulse the 
next day checked the return against actual votes cast. He admitted to a 
subsequent party enquiry24 that his action had been motivated by surprise 
that a meeting attended largely by former supporters of ‘The Labour Party’ 
had nevertheless elected half the delegates from the Macintyre ex-R.L.P. 
faction — an incredulity that reflected unfavourably upon the genuineness 
of Labour reunification. Claiming that the scrutineers had made an error, 
and that the ballots showed all four Labour Party candidates had been re­
turned, the Secretary requested an emergency meeting.
Further irregularities took place at this next meeting on 14 August. The 
Chairman asked all those present to come forward and identify their papers, 
thus destroying the secrecy of the ballot, and declined to hold fresh elections 
even when it was discovered non-members had voted. The ex-R.L.P. 
members, led by Macintyre, criticised his conduct, and succeeded in passing 
a vote of no-confidence in the Chair amidst taunts and threats of physical 
violence. The Chairman ignored the vote, at length declared the meeting 
closed and on his way out struck Macintyre who promptly retaliated.25 
After the meeting, an anonymous circular received wide circulation in 
Bulawayo, alleging that:
Mr. MacIntyre [sic] and his Party faked the count of the ballot so that 
their particular candidates should be elected. Unfortunately for the 
plotters this fact was discovered and a recount was called for. It should 
be obvious to all Labour supporters that we can never have a United 
Party until Mr. MacIntyre and his gang are ejected from the Party.26
As it turned out, however, it was the Davies-Keller group that left the party, 
within a month, ostensibly over the question of the African Headquarters 
Branch.
24 The ‘Lazarus Enquiry’ appointed by Congress in September 1944 to investigate the 
affairs of the Bulawayo North Branch. The Chairman, a Bulawayo attorney, was not a  
party member. Relevant papers are in SR9 1/5/2.
25 Leys, p.185 appears to confuse Davies jnr. with his father in this episode; Davies 
: tor. in fact acted as a restraining influence and prevented a general brawl.
' , 26 SR9 1/5/2, Exhibit A for the Lazarus Enquiry. The authorship is unknown and the
; Davies faction denied any knowledge of it.
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Originally the first initiative to bring educated Africans into closer contact 
with party politics seems to have come from certain groups in the pre-war 
R.L.P., curious about Charles Mzingeli’s past activities in the then defunct 
Independent Industrial and Commercial Workers Union of Rhodesia.27 
Prior to the general election of April 1939, Mzingeli received circular letters 
from both the United Party and the Rhodesia Party, inviting him personally 
to apply for membership. But after discussion with its organiser, he and 
R. Mfazi, another I.C.U. man, decided to join the R.L.P.. Mzingeli has 
consistently maintained that George Walker raised the matter first, an 
opinion borne out by manuscript sources.28 Indeed, Labour’s traditional 
attitude to the black worker caused Mzingeli some initial misgiving, and his 
final decision was rather an act of faith in the Labour involvement as a whole, 
‘wherein the ideals of true democracy, irrespective of race and colour, would 
be a fundamental and guiding principle.’29
An informal group of African members, resident in Harare, was according­
ly established in 1939; after a probationary period of two years, their applica­
tion for branch registration was approved by the N.E.C. in September 1941, 
on condition that literacy was to be a prerequisite for membership, and that 
the Branch, termed the ‘African H.Q. Branch’, should serve all Africans in 
the territory. Limited by this first condition, the Branch grew slowly; in 
July 1942 there were eighteen paid-up members, and only thirty-one early 
in 1944, seven of whom were voters.30 The relatively high entrance qualifica­
tion restricted membership to educated Africans, who sought such elitist 
goals as the relaxation of the Pass and Liquor laws for enfranchised African 
voters, and the right of skilled Africans to become ‘employees’ under the 
terms of the Industrial Conciliation Act.
The Branch was beset with petty rivalries and jealousies; Mzingeli and 
his allies did not hesitate to purge their more vociferous opponents, and 
these in turn lost no opportunity to criticise and condemn Mzingeli’s conduct 
of Branch affairs. On several occasions, the N.E.C. was requested to ad­
judicate disputes between Branch members: ‘The general lack of education 
is a vast handicap and tends to place power in the hands of a few who may 
not be the best leaders and who are themselves very vulnerable because of the 
mistakes they m ake\31In retrospect, the S.R.L.P. Propaganda Committee’s 
later assertion that the Branch had been ‘conducted during the whole period
27 For the early history o f the I.C.U., see T. O. Ranger, The African Voice in Southern 
Rhodesia 1898-1930, London, Heinemann, 1970, ch. 7, 8. The I.C.U. became defunct 
about 1937 but was to be revived in 1946 as the Reformed I.C.U.
28 University o f  Rhodesia, History Department Tape-Recordings, Interview with 
Mr. L. C. Mzingeli o f Harare, Salisbury, 15.ix.1970; I have greatly benefited from this 
discussion. SR9 1/1/1, Maasdorp to Mzingeli, 27.X.1938.
29 [Rhodes House, Oxford] F[abian] C[olonial] Bfureau Papers], LXV, Rhodesia 
(Southern), Political and Constitutional, Mzingeli: ‘A  Brief History o f the African Branch’, 
Sept. 1944.
30SR9 1/1/6 [Branch: Aug. 1938-N ov . 1947, African Headquarters: Nov. 1943- 
Nov. 1947], ‘List o f African Voters, 1/10/42-31/12/43’; Application for registration,
22. U944.
31 F.C.B., LXXI, Southern Rhodesia Correspondence, 1939-47, Maasdorp to R. Hinden,
23. X.1946.
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of its existence in an exemplary and orderly manner’32 seems merely fatuous, 
although stranger still is the failure of its enemies to have exploited this 
extravagant claim, attributable perhaps to general ignorance and indifference 
concerning the Branch, save as an emotive issue to stir up the party rank 
and file.
Although the 1941 Congress ratified its registration, there had been 
abundant signs of half-heartedness manifest in some quarters about bringing 
the Branch into party politics. Mrs. Maasdorp put the case for African 
participation to a reluctant Macintyre: ‘Surely it is better for them to be 
guided and led that [sic] to be open to undesirable influences?’33 This some­
what ambivalent argument, playing on the Rhodesian socialists’ fear of 
Bolshevism while appealing to his paternalist, better inclinations, eventually 
carried the day. The N.E.C. purposed the Branch’s role to be that of an 
advisory body for the party leadership on subjects pertaining to the general 
welfare of the black population, and a channel for the expression of African 
opinion. Had the raison d'etre for its existence remained within these narrow 
functional limits, it is unlikely that much trouble would have arisen. But 
few at the time foresaw the wider consequences of African involvement in 
white men’s politics: the implication of direct black representation at 
Congress and on the N.E.C., and the prospect that Africans might constitute 
a majority in the party in the not too remote future; and when the new 
S.R.L.P. had to face this prospect three years later, the reaction to all this 
was sharp and irrational.
Party officials later maintained that the initial registration had inspired 
no adverse comment. This statement was incorrect,34 but such disapproba­
tion as was expressed paled to insignificance in comparison with the furore 
succeeding the Harare Hall meeting of 12-13 February, 1944. This fateful 
gathering of fifty Africans and thirteen Europeans and Coloureds, comprising 
the annual general meeting of the African H.Q. Branch, would have received 
little attention from the public had not Mzingeli pressed the N.E.C. to 
accept the offer of The Rhodesia Herald to ‘cover’ it in their columns. The 
N.E.C., dubious of the objectivity of the ‘capitalist’ press pointed out that this 
would be contrary to normal procedure governing branch meetings, but 
relented to the extent of agreeing that a report could be submitted afterwards 
to the newspaper, provided all speakers’ names were suppressed. This 
maladroit compromise created an unfortunate and unnecessary atmosphere 
of devious secrecy; a few mornings later, the general public was alarmed to 
read that an unnamed white speaker at a ‘Native Branch. . .  Conference’ 
had promised a multi-racial audience that, ‘If the Africans organised them­
selves and showed themselves to be in earnest, the Government would have
32 SR9 1/4/3, Propaganda Committee Statement, n.d. [1946?].
33 SR9 1/1/1, 21.X.1941.
34 See for example F.C.B., LXV, ‘Short History of the R.L.P./S.R.L.P. by A. Draper, 
n.d. [February 1946?]; this appears to have been based on the chronological account in 
SR9 1/5/12. But see S. Blount’s letter protesting against the registration, The Rhodesia 
Herald, 19.ix.1941; SR9 1/5/2, S.R.L.P. press statement.
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to alter the clause of the Industrial Conciliation Act defining an “employee” , 
which at present meant a European employee’.35 The unintended mystery 
engendered wild and unfounded rumours of ‘aliens behind the scenes’, 
stirring up trouble amongst Africans while young Rhodesians served their 
country overseas.36
Notwithstanding all this agitation, the African H.Q. Branch was re­
registered with the new S.R.L.P. on 2 March 1944. The controversy caused 
by the Harare Hall meeting may have distracted attention from this step, 
which went unremarked at the time; it may also explain why those opposed 
to it later maintained that the registration had been a backstairs affair. The 
Rhodesia Herald joined the attack, remarking that, ‘It has still to be explained 
why so much secrecy should have surrounded the formation of that Branch.’37 
However, the storm did not break within party ranks until 24 March and 
bears the hallmark of a crisis specially manufactured for the occasion. On 
that day, Thomas Kimble, S.R.L.P. Member for Gatooma, publicly an­
nounced without prior intimation to the N.E.C. his intention to resign over 
the issue of African participation in party politics. A proposal that Kimble 
should be summarily deprived of membership for so criticising the party38 
was forestalled by his letter of resignation, accepted with alacrity despite 
Davies’s protests.
Kimble’s departure was the first crack in the facade of Labour’s new­
found unity. The Gatooma branch rallied to his defence, condemning the 
African branch registration as a mere ‘vote-catching stunt’.39 The N.E.C. 
was accused of authoritarian behaviour, although in this context it is relevant 
to quote the judgement of early Communist Party discipline that ‘severe 
punishment is not necessarily indicative of effective control’.40 Over the next 
six months the African Branch controversy simmered, branch secretaries 
repeatedly warning headquarters that the party was being steadily eroded 
away. Publicly, the N.E.C. temporised over the issue, stating that it was 
‘a question of policy which can only be changed by Congress’.41 In private, 
it capitulated to Davies’s request that the registration should be reconsidered, 
and after extracting a promise from all parties to abide by a legal opinion, 
approached L. M. N. Hodson for this purpose in April 1944. Hodson 
discounted Davies’s argument that the registration had been unconstitutional, 
but remarked that Congress appeared to have the right to rescind it, thus 
opening the door for future assaults.42 The reservation may account for the
35 The Rhodesia Herald, 18.ii.1944; cf. Doris Lessing’s draft notes o f the meeting 
which do not contain the important phrase ‘have to’ of the newspaper version, SR9 1/1/6.
36 The Rhodesia Herald, 25.ii.1944, letter from ‘Rhodesian’.
37 Ibid., 24.iii.1944.
38 Section 3(4) of the 1944 Constitution stated that, ‘no member shall adversely criticise 
the Policy of the Party except within the Councils o f the Party.’ After Kimble’s departure, 
this provision was made more stringent.
39 SR9 1/1/4, W. P. Cape (Ag. Hon. Sec., Gatooma Branch) to [Maasdorp?], 25.iii.1944.
40 H. Pelling, The British Communist Party: A Historical Profile, London, Black, 1958, 
p.19.
41 The Labour Front, April 1944, p.3.
42 SR9 1/5/2, ‘Ex parte S.R.L.P.’, delivered 3.V.1944.
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N.E.C.’s failure to employ Hodson’s opinion in later propaganda, and the 
imputation that the African Branch had been foisted on the party by under­
hand means gained wider currency.
On 22 September 1944, Davies and Keller resigned from the party twenty- 
four hours before Congress was due to assemble; once again, the N.E.C. 
received no prior warning, and the rebels gave the widest publicity to their 
defection. Davies and Keller thereupon revived ‘The Labour Party’ in order 
‘to regain the respect in which Labour was previously held’.43 The new party 
excluded Africans from membership, and Davies revived Labour’s pre-war 
African policy: opposition to the permanent urbanisation of Africans in 
white areas44 and further safeguards for white artisans against competition 
from cheap labour. The dissentients took with them a third Member of the 
Legislative Assembly, two entire branches and the best part of two others — 
all four the largest in the party. By February 1945, overall membership of 
the S.R.L.P. had dropped by a third, and with the exception of Macintyre’s 
all branches in Bulawayo and the Midlands had become moribund.
The proceedings of the S.R.L.P. Congress at Salisbury on 23-24 September, 
however, indicate that in spite of the departure of ‘The Labour Party’ 
grouping, there were still many opponents of the African Branch remaining in 
the S.R.L.P. Five resolutions were put, ranging from outright disaffiliation 
(Bindura) to one reducing the status of African delegates to that of observers 
(Bulawayo Central). A supplementary resolution, presented by Riversdale 
(Enkeldoorn) and proposing ‘Social security for both races in their own areas’ 
was a bizarre hybrid of segregationist and socialist philosophy. Four of these 
resolutions were rejected, and the fifth the N.E.C. amended to limit the 
number of African branches to one, a step taken to allay disquiet that 
the ‘Salisbury wing’ intended to swamp the party with black members. Con­
gress approved this alteration by 28 to 11, and it was appended to the 
Constitution.45
The African Branch itself was not content to remain a passive spectator 
in the debate over its future. Mzingeli supported the N.E.C. ‘one branch’ 
amendment, perhaps motivated by the consideration that his position as an 
established and recognised African leader might be jeopardised if other 
African branches were set up. His squabble with W. D. Ntuli, who advocated 
an autonomous Bulawayo branch,46 may be plausibly explained along these 
lines; on the other hand, his counter-argument that such action ‘might lead 
to trouble and might be exploited by unscrupulous individuals’47 suggests 
that Mzingeli was not only aware of the party’s predicament but also anxious 
lest another African branch, operating in an area remote from N.E.C. sur­
43 The Rhodesia Herald, 22.ix.1944.
44 Debates, 24, c.2691, 28.xi.1944.
46SR9 1/2/2, minutes; see also correspondence of the various branches, SR9 1/1/3, 
Branch: Aug. 1938-N ov . 1947, General: Feb. 1943-D ec. 1944.
48 For details o f this controversy which started in 1943, see SR9 1/1/6.
47SR9 1/1/2, Branch: Aug. 1938-N ov . 1947, General: Sept. 1942 - April 1944, 
[Maasdorp’sj minutes o f joint meeting [with the African Branch], 10.xi.1943.
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veillance, might bring African members and the party as a whole into 
disrepute. At a later stage in the debate, Ntuli abruptly shifted his ground 
and recommended that the African H.Q. Branch should voluntarily with­
draw from the party. So strong was the desire to foster African participation 
in white politics that the Branch resoundingly defeated this somewhat 
opportunist proposal. Ntuli lost further sympathy when it transpired that 
he had voted against the ‘one branch’ amendment at the September 1944 
Congress, contrary to Branch instructions.
Still optimistic about its chances, the S.R.L.P. now began to make prepara­
tions for the post-war general election; moribund branches were revived, 
enthusiasm re-kindled, policy formulated and clarified in response to the 
campaign of invective conducted by ‘The Labour Party’, which was extending 
its position. In March 1945, a mass meeting of Labour supporters at Que 
Que voted unanimously to sink their sectional differences in a third party, 
the Que Que United Labour Front, led by a former official of ‘The Labour 
Party’. The N.E.C. promptly condemned this move, but the hitherto aloof 
Trades and Labour Council now re-entered the political arena, encouraged 
by the Que Que initiative, and determined to create an effective workers’ 
movement against the United Party. The annual congress of this body 
agreed in principle in April to the setting up of a Labour (later Workers’) 
Representative Committee, which would select parliamentary candidates in 
the trade-union interest, and financed by a ‘contracting in’ political levy.
‘The Labour Party’ being predominantly trade-unionist48 welcomed this 
initiative, and Davies declared that, ‘no success would come to the Labour 
Party in this country until it was controlled by the trade unions’.49 This 
rather fulsome flattery earned its reward in July, when Arthur North re­
signed the Chairmanship of the S.R.L.P. after Macintyre and Lister voted 
in favour of removing the ‘closed shop’ principle from the revised Industrial 
Conciliation Bill,50 an action construed as antagonistic to white artisan 
interests; Lister’s speech in the debate, and in particular his reference to 
trade unions in which there was no ‘democratic control’,51 did not endear 
him to the Trades and Labour Council. Spurred on by the British Labour 
victory of 26 July, a further Congress of trade unions (at which ‘The Labour 
Party’ but not the S.R.L.P. was represented) adopted the constitution of the 
‘United Labour Party’ and resolved that it should be submitted to the two 
Labour Parties and the Que Que United Labour Front for approval. North 
took pains to reassure the labour movement that the United Labour Party 
was intended to be the nucleus of a labour front, and not a fourth party.
48 Of its Executive of 15 members, 11 were active trade-unionists. There was a con­
siderable overlap of membership between the Trades and Labour Council and the various 
Labour parties.
49 SR9 1/5/14 [Miscellaneous, Trades and Labour Council: June 1945-Oct. 1947], 
Minutes of Trades and Labour Council, Annual Congress held at Bulawayo, 7-8.iv.1945.
50 Debates, 25, c.2537, 18.vii.1945.
51 Ibid., c.2514, 17.vii.1945.
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Opinion in the S.R.L.P. was uniformly hostile to these proposals, and 
both advocates and opponents of the African Branch were united on this 
issue. Macintyre dismissed the United Labour Party as ‘a further effort to 
disrupt the movement’.52 Exception was taken to the presentation of the 
constitution as a fait accompli, and not as a basis for discussion; it was 
noted that political parties would have to dissolve themselves before seeking 
admission, as no provision had been made for affiliation; branches were to 
have little local autonomy; a colour-bar clause had been inserted into the 
constitution. But the most objectionable feature was the notion of ‘sectional 
control’ implicit in the document. Each trade union was to have two delegates 
at Congress, each branch only one: the Trades and Labour Council’s 
nineteen affiliated trade unions would thus command a floor majority. The 
Executive Council, consisting of three trade unionists, three branch re­
presentatives and two other delegates elected from the floor would similarly 
be under the thumb of the industrial section. The left-wing intellectuals of 
the N.E.C. of the S.R.L.P. doubted whether trade unionists always made 
good socialists, and interpreted the U.L.P. scheme as an attempt to impose 
an industrial dictatorship over the movement. Congress shared to the full 
this distrust of sectional control and unanimously rejected the Trades and 
Labour Council proposals on 16 September 1945.53
This action of the S.R.L.P. saved ‘The Labour Party’ from having to make 
a painful decision on its attitude to the proposed U.L.P., and enabled Davies’s 
group to pose as the trade unions’ champion, and denounce the principles 
of the S.R.L.P. as ‘based apparently on the same foundations of commercial 
and industrial segregation as marked the operations of the Italian Fascist 
Party’.54 Such brave words, however, did not greatly help the United Labour 
Party. A thinly-attended Trades and Labour Council meeting convened at 
Salisbury on 14 October to debate the details further, evinced little en­
thusiasm in the venture; several delegates pointed out that their trade union 
constitutions prohibited party political activity. Nothing daunted, the 
indefatigable North tried again. To ensure a better attendance, he chose the 
trade union centre of Bulawayo as the venue for another meeting; however, 
this second conference on 17 November attracted scarcely more delegates 
than the first. The idea of a United Labour Party was given a final airing, 
and then laid to rest with few to mourn its passing.
North then produced an alternative plan, a refurbishing of the Trades and 
Labour Council initiative of 1943: he announced that the Council would be 
pleased to act as an ‘honest broker’ at unity discussions between the execut­
ives of the S.R.L.P., ‘The Labour Party’ and the Que Que Labour Front. 
Leaders of the various parties were summoned to the conference and asked 
to express their views. Macintyre consented to the suggestion, subject to his
52 SR9 1/4/3, Macintyre to Mrs. E. A. Strobel (Hon. Gen. Sec., S.R.L.P.), 4.ix.l945.
53 SR9 1/1/8, Branch: Aug. 1938-N ov . 1947, Salisbury City: May 1942-Jan. 1947, 
United Labour Party Constitution, 3.ix.l945 (under letterhead of the Trades and Labour 
Council); SR9 1/2/2, Minutes of S.R.L.P. Congress, 16.ix.1945.
54 The Labour Era, 27.X.1945, p.4.
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Executive’s consent. After some hesitation, Davies also agreed, reiterating 
his conviction that, ‘The Trades and Labour Council should have a very 
big say’ in any re-united Labour party.55 All three parties ultimately signified 
their willingness to meet North’s officials, and a conference was scheduled 
for 8 December at Gwelo.
During the interval, two events occurred that substantially reduced the 
chances of re-unification. The first of these, the African railway strike of 
late October and early November 1945, occasioned initial alarm and hostility, 
although sympathy swung towards the strikers after the publication of the 
Tredgold Report;56 57 meanwhile, vague rumours that the S.R.L.P. had 
fomented the strike gained wide credence.67 Secondly, shortly before the 
Gwelo negotiations, ‘The Labour Party’ published its constitution, a docu­
ment that further widened the Labour split. That the Davies faction hoped 
to win over from the S.R.L.P. those who were disaffected with the so-called 
dictatorship of the ‘Salisbury wing’ was evident in the provision for a de­
centralised party organisation, comprising five area committees, occupying 
an intercalary position to the central executive and themselves, and a Nation­
al Executive Committee on which branch representatives were to have all 
the seats except four.58 ‘The Labour Party’ subsequently explained that the 
Colony’s ‘sparse population’ and widely-separated ‘main centres’ necessitated 
this type of structure.59 It implied a greater measure of local democracy 
at the regional level, and had the party been able to call upon the services of 
a sufficient number of ‘leisured’ branch officials, ‘grass roots’ control might 
have been feasible at the national level. In practice, however, this variety of 
party organisation represented a step backwards to the ad hoc methods of 
the 1930s, and enabled a handful of personalities at the centre to pursue their 
own course, largely independent of rank and file opinion. A further clause 
in this new constitution specifically excluded Africans from membership. 
The party Chairman, J. Fairlamb, affirmed that Labour’s pre-war con­
ception of the African’s role in white areas as ‘the hewer of wood and the 
drawer of water’ would be sustained, although endeavours should be made 
to improve his working and living conditions.58
When negotiations began at Gwelo60 on 8 December they were charged 
with a singular note of urgency, as it was clear that this would be the last 
opportunity for the sundered movement to unite if it were to make a bid for 
the postal vote of Rhodesians on active service overseas,61 a vote Labour
55 SR9 1/5/14, Minutes of the Trades and Labour Council Meeting, Bulawayo, 17.xi‘ 
1945 (wrongly dated June.)
56 Southern Rhodesia. Report o f  Commission . . .  to Investigate . . .  the Strike amongst 
the African Employees o f  the RhodesianRailways. . . ,  Salisbury, Govt. Stationery Office, 
1946. See also R. Gray, The Two Nations, London, O.U.P., 1960, p.284.
57 The Labour Front, January 1946.
58 The Labour Era, l.xii.1945.
59 Ibid., January 1946.
60 A  shortened and fictionalised account of these proceedings can be found in the last 
chapter of D. Lessing, A Ripple from the Storm.
61 A deadline of 14 December had been set for the registration of political parties 
seeking this vote, Southern Rhodesia Government Gazette, 9.xi.l945, Proclamation No. 31.
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believed would be given to them. This sense of urgency may have been 
responsible for the accusation of bad faith afterwards made against the 
S.R.L.P.. Long before the executives of the three parties and the Trades 
and Labour Council met at Gwelo, it had become plain that the price for 
unity would not only be the African Branch, but also the end to the Salisbury 
left-wingers’ control over policy. On the first day a sub-committee of seven 
on which the S.R.L.P. had only two representatives, Draper and Mrs. 
Maasdorp, was appointed to hammer out a framework for agreement.62 At 
the committee’s first session, ‘The Labour Party’ delegates undertook to 
tolerate African membership, but the Branch itself would have to be dis­
solved. According to her report delivered to the S.R.L.P. the next day, 
Mrs. Maasdorp dissented from ‘The Labour Party’ compromise at all sessions 
of this ad hoc body and of a subsequently-appointed ‘sub-committee of 
thirteen’; however, her notes on the discussion bear the following cryptic, 
ambiguous annotation: ‘We gave way on everything else on the understand­
ing that the African membership would be retained (the Party might have 
accepted the dissolution) . .  ,’.63
Whatever exactly happened at this meeting, the possibility of compromise 
was imperilled when the sub-committee reported back to the conference 
after its first session. Davies retracted the undertaking his representatives 
had given, pleading that there had been a misunderstanding. After protracted 
negotiations in committee and open session lasting well into the evening, the 
assembly drew up a list of nine points for submission to each Labour party.64 
Several of these constituted major concessions from the S.R.L.P., offered in 
the vain hope that the other side would give way on the African issue. The 
S.R.L.P. was to have only six of the nineteen members of a Provisional 
Executive; Macintyre was to stand down as leader in favour of Walker; 
the choice of location for the party headquarters was to be left to the Pro­
visional Executive, and in all likelihood would be Bulawayo; all funds were 
to be pooled — a major sacrifice, as the S.R.L.P. had amassed a large 
election treasury. However, there was no agreement over the African 
Branch, except that two alternative courses of action should be submitted 
to each party for approval.
This key issue had polarised the inter-executive conference, the hitherto 
outwardly impartial North now siding with Davies and the Que Que Labour 
Front against the S.R.L.P. and its insistence upon principle. At length, 
Col. T. Nangle, the Que Que leader, had proposed that, ‘the African Branch 
should be dissolved and that a liaison committee be appointed. . .  to co­
operate with the African members of the party’: a return in substance to the
62 The others were two: ‘Labour Party’; two: Trades and Labour Council; and one: 
Que Que United Labour Front.
63SR9 1/4/3, S.R.L.P. Propaganda Committee, n.d. N o formal minutes of the com­
mittee’s deliberations are available. The minutes of the open conference, entitled ‘Minutes 
of the Meeting held at Gwelo, 8th December, 1945 . . . ’, are in SR9 1/2/2.
64 SR9 1/2/2, ‘Recommendations put forward to Congress by Special Committee, n.d. 
[9.xii.l945].
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1939 position. Nangle’s resolution was set down as an alternative to ‘The 
Labour Party’ proposal that no more Africans should be admitted to 
membership. A rider was added to the effect that the whole ‘question of 
African members and African branches’ should be referred to a later 
Congress. This somewhat confusing formula, which represented a softening 
of the early intransigence of ‘The Labour Party’, was accepted on the under­
standing that if either alternative was approved by all concerned, a united 
labour party would be set up forthwith under the revived name of the 
Rhodesian Labour Party. It was later maintained that Draper and Mrs. 
Maasdorp had accepted this as a quid pro quo for the de-registration of the 
African Branch, and North expressed his astonishment when Mrs. Maasdorp 
moved the rejection of these terms the next day.65 In the absence of complete 
documentation, it is impossible to establish the degree to which the S.R.L.P. 
delegates might have wavered on this point of principle.
Mrs. Maasdorp’s speech to the S.R.L.P. Special Congress the following 
day, 9 December,66 was long and passionate. She warned the delegates 
against the studied vagueness of the liaison committee’s proposed formula, 
and concluded with the declaration that, ‘Unity can be bought at too great 
a price.’ James Lister supported her views, adding that as five out of six of 
North’s officials present at the previous day’s negotiations were known 
supporters of ‘The Labour Party’, the nine points represented nothing but 
a Davies diktat, and the prescribed composition of the Provisional Executive 
would entrench his followers in an unassailable position over the party. A 
heated debate ensued, in which a Midlands dissentient asked if Congress 
were ‘to stand here today in the interests of 30 [black] representatives as 
against 4/5ths of the European workmen of the country’. Finally, the 
matter was pressed to a ballot, and the terms rejected by the narrow margin 
of 17 votes to 12; four non-branch officials on the N.E.C. voted against the 
platform, a portent of future trouble for the S.R.L.P.
Despite the collapse of the re-union conference, the pressure for Labour 
fusion remained unslackened during the last days of 1945, as election day 
drew nigh. Several perturbed S.R.L.P. leaders clandestinely approached 
North and asked him to sustain his efforts; accordingly he wrote to each 
of the Labour parties on 22 December, proposing yet another joint conference 
at Gwelo, and a postal ballot of all members on the question of the African 
Branch versus ‘a non-political African Council. . .  under the guidance and 
advice of Europeans.’67
Whilst the Davies party somewhat reluctantly agreed to this, the S.R.L.P., 
incensed at North’s remark that its Special Congress at Gwelo had not been 
truly representative of its rank and file opinion, rejected the suggestion out 
of hand on the grounds that only Congress could reverse a decision it had
65 The Rhodesia Herald, 4.i.l946.
66 SR9 1/2/2, Minutes of the Special Congress at Gwelo, 9.xii.l945.
67 The Rhodesia Herald, 24.xii.1945.
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made earlier. Furthermore, by precluding free and open discussion, a secret 
ballot savoured of the methods used by ‘Nazi leaders in Germany’.68
North’s persistence had not, however, been in vain. On 28 December, 
Walker of the S.R.L.P. publicly recanted his error in supporting the left­
wingers at Gwelo69 and, backed by a second S.R.L.P. member of the 
Legislative Assembly, E.P. Vernall, asked Draper to re-open the negotiations. 
An emergency meeting of the N.E.C. of the S.R.L.P. was convened on 30 
December. The detailed Minutes of this meeting attest to the widening 
crack that North’s endeavours had induced in the ‘Salisbury wing’.70 On 
behalf of his branch (Salisbury South), Walker moved that a postal ballot 
should be held, declaring that the African masses were not yet ‘lit’ to take 
part in politics. When it became clear that the radicals had mustered a 
majority of accredited delegates present, he suggested that the rules be 
suspended to allow non-accredited observers, most of them favourable to 
his cause, to vote. Draper ruled this out of order, and Walker substituted an 
amendment calling for a round-table conference on the ‘nine points’. This 
was narrowly lost by a single vote71 in favour of a  motion calling for an 
electoral pact and a post-election joint conference, neither of which material­
ised.
Shortly after the New Year, Walker submitted his resignation from the 
N.E.C. and from the S.R.L.P., and publicly requested all members of the 
labour movement to contact him. Salisbury South and six other S.R.L.P. 
branches joined him, accompanied by E. P. Vernall and another S.R.L.P. 
Member, A. W. Whittington. Walker explained his conduct in a letter to 
Draper: ‘I am sorry that through the dictatorship of a clique of your party, 
I felt impelled to resign in order to save the Labour movement from obliv­
ion.’72 After a series of discussions with North and Nangle, he made peace 
with Davies at Bulawayo, and was given the largely nominal position of leader 
in the Rhodesia Labour Party which they now revived on pre-war lines. 
On most issues he gave way; he repented of his share in the making of the 
African Branch, agreed to the exclusion of Africans from membership, and 
endorsed the R.L.P.’s adoption of the decentralised organisation of ‘The 
Labour Party’. In point of fact, he had voluntarily become the prisoner of 
‘The Labour Party’ group; and after losing his seat in the 1946 election, left 
Davies in undisputed control. Meanwhile, despite this severe loss of branches 
and members the S.R.L.P.’s morale remained high; purged of traitors, the 
party was now truly united and firm in purpose, and expected success at the 
forthcoming elections.73
68 SR9 1/5/14, E. A. Strobel to A. T. North, 31.xii.1945.
89 SR9 1/1/4, ‘Minutes of a special meeting o f Salisbury South Branch', 28.xii.1945.
70 SR9 1/5/14, ‘Minutes of a special meeting of the National Executive Council. . .  
30th December 1945’.
71 Eight votes to nine; six of the branch delegates voted for, and four against. Gwelo 
which was not ‘financial’, was represented by an observer, and Doris Lessing was not per­
mitted to vote in absentia on behalf o f Mashaba. Both branches supported Walker, and so 
Draper’s ruling was of crucial importance to the later history of the Labour movement.
72 SR9 1/4/3, Walker to Draper, 19.L1946.
73 The Labour Front, February 1946.
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In the event, neither the S.R.L.P. nor its R.L.P. rival received much cheer 
from the election results of 25 April 1946. Overall, Labour’s combined vote 
was down by a third compared with the 1939 returns.74 Only Lister and 
Macintyre were elected for the S.R.L.P., which in all won 1 540 votes (5,61 
per cent). These two successful candidates may in fact have won their seats 
in spite of the declared policy of the party; for the ‘best man’ principle seems to 
have played a large part in determining votes and they were probably elected 
on the basis of their personality, honesty and political consistency. The 
defeat of all those recently seceding from the S.R.L.P. who stood for the 
revived R.L.P. gives added weight to this contention. The Davies grouping 
of the revived R.L.P., however, fared better, obtaining three seats and 
securing 4 583 votes (16,69 per cent of the total). Huggins’s United Party 
won a further mandate, although not an absolute majority; but the Liberals 
displaced Labour as the official Opposition.75
The election campaign had been hard-fought and often bitter, the African 
Branch issue offering opportunities for the expression of race-prejudice that 
were not always overlooked. The Liberal Party published a cartoon depicting 
a black ‘cookboy’ informing his indignant ‘madam’, ‘Mena funa hamba lo 
blanch meeting ka lo Labour Party (I want to go to the Branch Meeting of 
the Labour Party)’.76 Rumours were rife that the S.R.L.P. wanted to lower 
the franchise, add thousands of Africans to the voters’ roll and establish 
more African branches. Shortly before polling, an attempt was made to 
identify the Party’s policy towards Africans with that of British Labour and 
the Fabians, already a bete noire to most Rhodesians. At a Raylton public 
meeting, the S.R.L.P. candidate was subjected to an interrogation as to 
whether members of his party would ‘sit down to dinner with a native, or let 
a native marry their daughters.’77 Sometimes speakers unwittingly provided 
ammunition for their opponents; Macintyre’s comment that his party 
would select immigrants on the basis of ‘character’ rather than colour was 
later used as evidence that, amongst its other sins, the S.R.L.P. wanted to 
flood the country with Indians. The R.L.P. campaigned on the pre-war 
platform of its namesake; it warned that if the permanent urbanisation of 
Africans were continued, ‘then the present civilised standards will disappear 
and the European must go to other lands.’78 An anonymous trade-unionist 
wrote to the Press that the ‘Friends of the Soviet Union’ now dictated the 
policy of Macintyre’s party, and had been responsible for the Gwelo failure.79
74 G. C. Passmore and M. T. Mitchell, Source Book o f  Parliamentary Elections and
Referenda in Southern Rhodesia 1898-1962, Salisbury, Univ. Coll, o f Rhodesia and Nyasa- 
land, Dept, o f Government, 1963, Source Book No. 1, pp. 147, 156.
76 Ibid., p.156; one seat, Lomagundi, however was transferred from the Liberal to the 
United Party after a recount (see Government Gazette, 15.vii.1946, Proclamation No. 26). 
The final state o f the parties therefore was: U.P.: 14; Liberals: 11; R.L.P.: 3; S.R.L.P.: 
2. I am grateful to Mr. D . Hartridge o f the National Archives of Rhodesia for this point.
76 New Rhodesia, 17.viii.1945.
77 The Bulawayo Chronicle, 3.iii.l946.
78 The Labour Era, April 1946.
79 The Rhodesia Herald, 21.xi.1945.
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The ‘Salisbury wing’ interpreted this stirring up of race-prejudice in 
socialist terms. In Draper’s words, it represented ‘the last dying kick of a 
rotten, played-out system and a most convenient political weapon which 
lesser minds simply cannot resist.’80 He thus equated the capitalist system 
with racialism, and by the same token, he condemned the R.L.P. which had 
‘no socialist objective and debars Africans from membership.’81 But the 
views of S.R.L.P. candidates on the Africans’ future reflected the character­
istic amorphousness of rank and file feeling, and sometimes diverged from 
those of the ‘Salisbury wing’. A few of their statements, particularly those 
emanating from party standard-bearers in rural areas, must have caused the 
N.E.C. ‘radicals’ acute embarrassment. One candidate reassured his farmer 
constituents that the party did not have ‘visions of a social equality between 
the two races’; he added that, ‘Genetic reasons alone are sufficient to rule 
that out.’82 Another devoted the best part of his manifesto to promises of 
further government assistance to cattle-breeders, and did not mention the 
African once.83
This would appear to validate Henderson’s contention that the S.R.L.P. 
was ‘often lukewarm’;84 on the other hand, party headquarters did make a 
stand on liberal principles, promising ‘to translate into actuality, through 
Parliamentary action, the high principles of the Atlantic Charter.’85 More 
specifically, it developed the generalised aims of the Short Term Policy into 
a practicable programme for African material and political advance. How­
ever, this programme received little publicity, and even less emphasis on the 
hustings. Some candidates tended to be apologetic and sought to escape 
criticism by avoiding such disputatious matters. Those of braver mien cited 
Rhodes’s dictum of ‘equal rights for all civilised men’ in support of the 
African Branch, but it seems that S.R.L.P. candidates largely remained on 
the defensive throughout the entire campaign.
Finally, why was the S.R.L.P.’s performance at the polls so poor? As 
Leys remarks, the disunity of the labour movement disenchanted the 
electorate,86 while the emergence of the old-style laissez-faire Liberals, 
standing well to the right of the United Party, bestowed an aura of centrism 
upon the outgoing Government. This the United Party exploited in their 
campaign slogan, ‘Neither Socialist nor Capitalist — the People’s Party.’87
80 Ibid., 8.i.l946.
81 F.C.B. LXV, ‘Short History of R.L.P./S.R.L.P. by A. Draper’, n.d. [February 
1946].
82 SR9 1/3/2, Elections: July 1939 - May 1946,1946 Election: March 1945 - May 1946, 
E. Harben’s circular to electors in Marandellas constituency, n.d. [19461.
83 Ibid., M. Olds’s circular to electors in Western constituency, n.d. [1946].
841. Henderson ‘British working-class immigrants to Rhodesia . . . ’, in Revisions in 
Central African History, 40.
85 The Rhodesia Herald, 22.ii.1946.
86 Leys, p. 186. Leys’s further explanation (ibid., p.187) that recent immigrants ‘more 
readily voted for the United Party’ can hardly apply to this election, as immigration had 
virtually ceased during the War whilst the fore-runners o f the post-war flood from Britain 
could not have been resident long enough to gain admission to the voters’ roll; see Section 
8(l)(a) o f the Electoral Act (No. 23 of 1928) which requires six months residence.
87 United Party Newsletter, February 1946, N o. 9.
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The plethora of four political parties and ninety-nine candidates raised 
the spectre of an indecisive result, and the conviction was widespread that a 
vote for the S.R.L.P. would be in effect a vote for the Liberals; this may 
have induced many waverers to vote United Party and ensure the continuance 
of stable government. The S.R.L.P., whose prospects had been earlier over­
estimated by an otherwise hostile press,88 nominated only eleven candidates,89 
thus depriving itself of the opportunity to win a majority in the Assembly. 
Lister’s assertion that, ‘We are not putting many candidates in the field, but 
if we have not got the quantity, we have the quality’90 did not compensate 
for the fact that a vote for the S.R.L.P. was perforce a vote against a clear-cut 
election result. Accordingly, the R.L.P. with its fuller state of twenty-three 
candidates was a stronger contender in the electoral stakes, as evinced by its 
larger share of the poll. But relative numbers of candidates and stable 
government aside, the S.R.L.P. lost simply because its African policy was 
‘premature. . . and of course, suicidal.’84 In any case, Labour as a whole 
constituted only one of several white groups in a country where the pro­
portion of European voters in managerial positions was relatively high, and 
the S.R.L.P. represented but a single small segment of a single interest 
group. Accordingly, liberal forces could not prevail in the Colony until the 
burgeoning professional and commercial sectors of the European population 
were prepared to accept certain progressive elements in the party’s policy, 
such as African membership of political parties, a process that commenced 
in the next decade.
In conclusion, several main threads can be drawn from the tangled skein 
of congresses and conferences, fusions and fissions, accusations and counter­
accusations that make up the history of the Labour movement in these three 
crucial years. These are: the role of the African Branch as compared with 
other factors in the fostering of Labour disunity; the attitude of the white 
trade-unionist to these squabbles, as epitomised by the part the Trades and 
Labour Council intermittently played in the events described above; the 
failure of the Rhodesian electorate to follow Britain’s example and return 
a post-war Labour government, and the general relevance of socialism to the 
Colony’s situation.
First of all, to what extent did the African Branch and African membership 
contribute to Labour’s splitting asunder? Davies’s position was based on 
the firm conviction that it was contrary to the interests of both races that 
either should continue, especially as it had the undesirable effect of according 
Africans direct representation on the party’s councils. From this precept, all 
else followed. Can the failure to unite at Gwelo therefore be attributed solely 
to the existence of the Branch? This point of view was sedulously cultivated 
in the Press and elsewhere during the election campaign. Yet such an
88 The Argus Press supported the United Party; see editorials in The Rhodesia Herald, 
19.iv.1946; The Bulawayo Chronicle, 25.iv.1946.
89 Leys, p.186 gives an incorrect figure o f sixteen.
90 The Rhodesia Herald, 21.iii.1946.
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explanation savours of over-simplification. Admittedly, the contemporary 
climate of race relations rendered it inevitable that the Branch should become 
the main bone of contention, a convenient Aunt Sally for the Labour 
dissentients.
Nevertheless, one forms the impression that the S.R.L.P. by default 
allowed its opponents to concentrate their attacks on the Branch, and so 
relegate the other points at issue to a relatively minor status. Hence Macin- 
tyre’s lament at the N.E.C. emergency meeting following the Gwelo negotia­
tions: ‘We should never have been put in the position that all that mattered 
was the African question — we should have had a counter proposition which 
they in their turn would have had to reject.’91 Ironically, the S.R.L.P. had 
sometimes shown tepid enthusiasm for the Branch and African advancement 
generally. The famous Atlantic Charter motion of October 1943 for example 
had been introduced by two liberal members of the United Party, W. H. 
Eastwood and L. B. Fereday, and the S.R.L.P. had contributed little to the 
ensuing debate.92 Indeed, an examination of the speeches of S.R.L.P. 
Members leaves one with the feeling that party representatives were concern­
ed rather with the workers’ conditions in England and Attlee’s victory at the 
polls in 1945: tangible evidence of the attachment to ‘Home’ that still 
characterised most Rhodesians of British origin.
Amongst the other factors contributing to Labour disunity, pride of place 
should be given to personality clashes, a phenomenon epitomised by a war­
time Minister: ‘we are so small, we are so governed by petty jealousy, by petty 
spites, we know each other’s business so much and that influences things so 
much’.93 The dispute within Labour ranks crystallised around the personal­
ities of two ambitious men, Davies and Macintyre, who became leaders of 
rival factions in the movement. Labour’s career between 1940 and 1946 was 
essentially a story of the struggle for power between these two men, each 
becoming the figurehead for impersonal and opposing forces operating 
within the labour movement.
Traditional antipathy of the trade-unionists to intellectuals and socially- 
mobile elements added a further dimension to the conflict, as expressed in. a 
remark made at a 1945 trade-union meeting: ‘We don’t want clever, brainy 
men, or men who want to climb to the top of the working-class movement.’94 
This type of sentiment helps to explain why the S.R.L.P. lost the support of 
most European artisans before the 1946 general election, and why the Trades 
and Labour Council endeavoured to create a party dedicated to its cause. 
Unlike the British Labour Party,95 96the S.R.L.P. made no provision for direct 
trade union representation on its Executive, a factor indubitably responsible
91 SR9 1/5/14, N.E.C. Minutes, 30.xii.1945.
92 Debates, 23, c.2302 ff„ 20-29.x. 1943.
93 Ibid., 21, c.3724, J. H. Smit on his resignation from the Cabinet, ll.ii.1942.
94SR9 1/5/14, Minutes of the Trades and Labour Council meeting, Bulawayo, 17.xi.
1945.
96 See European Political Parties, ed. S. Henig and J. Pinder, London, Allen and Unwin, 
1969, p.407.
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for its drift towards doctrinaire and largely academic socialism, and the 
growing disenchantment of white workers with socialist solutions. G. D. H. 
Cole’s comment, that workers’ associations ‘still think more in terms of 
bettering the position of their members under capitalism than of fighting 
to make an end of capitalism’,96 exactly describes the post-war situation in 
Rhodesia. To the average white trade-unionist, who feared economic 
competition from skilled and semi-skilled Africans, the machinations of the 
middle-class, ‘intellectual Salisbury wing’ represented left-wing deviationism 
of the most extreme and irresponsible kind — irresponsible because it 
seemed to jeopardise his economic standing and his very presence in the 
Colony. The strong resentment stemming from headquarters’ disproportion­
ate power in the party’s council was a further factor contributing to the 
Labour split.
The war had brought full employment and prosperity to European 
working-classes, a process that accelerated after 1945 with the expansion of 
secondary industry and the application of Keynsian economics, ultimately 
leading to the collapse of Rhodesian Labour.96 7 That the implications of this 
were not fully understood or appreciated in certain Labour circles is exempli­
fied by Lister’s confident prediction that once the initial post-war boom had 
run its course, there would be a downturn in the world trade-cycle similar 
to that of 1920-1921.98 9Presumably he expected that a depression would 
furnish new recruits to the Labour cause and so assist in the defeat of an 
incumbent capitalist administration. In practice, the Colony’s continued 
economic progress reduced the income gap between white working and 
middle-classes and steadily undermined the labour movement’s source of 
support. However, the S.R.L.P. Papers indicate that some members had 
correctly interpreted these unfavourable signs; at the end of 1946, Doris 
Lessing remarked that the economic upturn had ‘made it easy and natural 
for the weaker and the more uninformed members’ to drift away from 
socialism." Labour parties were powerless to halt this drift, and Labour as 
a political force faded out during the early 1950s, having failed to mobilise 
the truly proletarian elements of Southern Rhodesia, the Africans.
Finally, two general but important questions: first, did the S.R.L.P. fully 
realise what consequences the implementation of socialist doctrine would 
have in Rhodesia; and second, was the socialist philosophy of the ‘Salisbury 
wing’ immediately relevant to the contemporary situation? The answer to 
both quite simply must be ‘no’. Infused with idealism, the radicals handled 
essentially theoretical concepts, unconscious of their implicit capacity for 
rapid, almost revolutionary, change. The Atlantic Charter’s reference to 
‘the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they 
shall live’ indicated an aim far in advance of the political convictions of the
96 G. D. H. Cole, Fabian Socialism, London, Allen and Unwin, 1943, p.150.
9 7 Leys, p.186.
98 The Rhodesia Herald, 21.iii.1946.
99 SR9 1/1/4, [Notes taken by C. J. Oliver] at N.E.C. meeting, 15.xii.1946.
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‘Salisbury wing’. The Rhodesian reality was outlined with candour by a 
member of Huggins’s party: ‘The Europeans could not have the standard of 
living they have today if it were not for the fact that we have a big native 
population who are doing a very great proportion of the work of this country. 
I have never heard the racialists make any very strong demand that the 
interests of those natives should be considered in these magnificent socialist 
dreams that they put forward’.100 Socialism of even the most moderate variety 
found only thin soil for its roots in Rhodesia; the majority of its principles 
were irrelevant to the most pressing problems of a stratified multi-racial 
society. The chief legacy handed to the white ‘progressives’ of the 1950s 
was in socialist terms an incidental, yet in Rhodesian terms the most con­
tentious aspect of the S.R.L.P.’s policy — the participation of Africans in 
European politics. Its socialist heritage has found no inheritor.
100 Debates, 25, c.1285, 6.vi.l945.
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